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Abstract
This paper presents some artiﬁcial stylised facts emerging in a simulated con-
testable market where ﬁrms interact with each other in taking their stay or go de-
cision. I use nearly zero-intelligence ﬁrms: no optimisation is considered, and all
the ﬁrms sell at a ﬁxed price an equal quantity of the good. The entry of new ﬁrms
is triggered by the overall proﬁtability of the market, measured by the spread be-
tween the average rate of proﬁt and the interest rate. The exit decision is modelled
via a mean ﬁeld effect, to take into account in the decision process both the per-
formance of the individual ﬁrm, and the information about the proﬁtability of the
market that can be abduced looking at the stay or go decision of the other ﬁrms.
Financial requirements of production are considered, with a spread between credi-
tor and debtor interest rates. The model is simulated with an ACE approach, using
the Swarm libraries released by the Santa Fe Institute.
1 Introduction
Empirical literature in industrial dynamics has underlined since a long time many
stylised facts relating ﬁrms distribution characteristics — such as the different dynamic
path followed by large and small ﬁrms, a right skewed size distribution, the presence of
an equilibrium positive ﬁrms turnover — that cannot be adequately tackled within the
Representative Agent (RA) framework. As it seems, real markets are characterised by
a ”tremendous within-industry heterogeneity” that is not cancelled out by the ’selection
of the ﬁttest’, and that requires a speciﬁc attention (Haltiwanger 1997 ).
The weaknesses of the RA framework have been pointed out also from a method-
ologicalpoint of view,and theeffectsthat heterogeneity andinteraction among individ-
uals can have on macrodynamics — particularly in presence of market imperfections
and strategic complementarities — have become a growing ﬁeld of investigation (Kir-
man 1992 , Gallegati and Kirman 1999 , Delli Gatti et al. 2000).
A natural and sometimes ”radical” way of coping with heterogeneity is by means
of agent-based simulations. We may see AB simulations as just a different path to
simpliﬁcation. Getting away from a 1:1 map of the world, the mainstream way is to
1model markets with an over simpliﬁed structure, and populate them with few cate-
gories of super-rational perfectly informed agents — some times capable of solving
even uncomputable tasks. The opposite path is followed by AB practitioners, who
usually endow their agents with just limited information and bounded rationality, and
spend their degrees of freedom allowing for heterogeneity, learning, interaction and
so on. The most radical way of doing this is to adopt ”zero-intelligence” (ZI) agents,
and look whether their interaction in a well deﬁned market microstructure give rise to
macrobehaviours that tend to replicate those predicted by models with rational and in-
formed agents (Gode and Sunder 1993 and 1997, Terna 1998, Mirowski and Somefun
2000). The spirit is well synthesised by Epstein: ”The issue is not howmuch rationality
there is (at the micro level), but how little is enough to generate the macroequilibrium”
(Epstein 1999).
I adopted this kind of modelling to show how ZI-agents can be useful in the inves-
tigation of industrial dynamics; namely, in the study of the relations between entry-exit
of ﬁrms in/out of a contestable market, their ﬁnancial position, and business ﬂuctua-
tions. The adoption of the ZI hypothesis allowed me to show how the free entry-exit of
ﬁrms, together with heterogeneity in their ﬁnancial position, are sufﬁcient hypotheses
to generate rather interesting aggregate dynamics, and to reproduce some stylised facts
pointed out by the empirical literature on this topic. Among the artiﬁcial stylised facts
produced running simulations of the model, there is a right skewed distribution for
the equity base, attributable mainly to a composition effect; a long run positive ﬁrms
turnover, due to a positive probability of exiting the market also during expansions;
business cycles, due to the interaction component of the decision taken by the ﬁrms.
In next two sections, I brieﬂy review the literature of interest. In the following,
I present the algebra of the model, and a qualitative analysis of its dynamics with no
heterogeneity among ﬁrms. Some other results on the dynamics emerging are given in
section four, where I simulate the same base model. The effects of heterogeneity are
then studied, putting idiosyncratic shocks on the price at which ﬁrms are selling their
good. Some concluding remarks will follow.
2 Main empirical ﬁndings
The issue of ﬁrms’ demography came to the attention of the scholars at the beginning
of the Thirties, with the seminal work of Robert Gibrat (1931). His goal was to explain
the skew distributions that could be observed in many contexts, among which in ﬁrm
size in manufacturing industries. Gibrat ﬁrstly observed that his data ﬁt well with a
lognormal distribution. To ”generate” such form, he assumed a linkage between a
ﬁrm’s current size and his rate of growth: Namely, he proposed that a ﬁrm’s absolute
growth were a normally distributed random variable, whose mean was proportional to
his actual size. In other words, that a ﬁrm rate of growth were a normally distributed
random variable with mean independent of the ﬁrm’s current size; the so called ”Law
of proportionate effect” (see the survey in Schmalensee 1989).
After about two decades of but little research on this topic, starting from the late
Fifties many empirical studies essentially conﬁrmed Gibrat’s law: At least on average,
thereseemedtobe norelationsbetweenﬁrms’ sizeandtheirproportionalrateofgrowth
2(Hart and Prais 1956; Simon and Bonini 1958; Hymer and Pashigian 1962; Ijiri and
Simon, 1977). The evidence on the lognormal shape of the distribution, however, was
less sound; the ”main” fact appeared to be a right skewed distribution, whichever the
underlying functional form.
These early investigations on the Gibrat’s law had a severe limit in the data sets
available at the time. In the last decades, researchers in a number of countries gained
access to longitudinal data sets on business units — mainly of administrative source. It
has been possible, then, to trace individual data on entries, exits, and life trajectories of
ﬁrms, and a great deal of stylised facts has been produced with a greater detail. John
Sutton (1997) and Richard Caves (1998) survey the many researches that have been
produced on the ”Gibrats legacy” and the most recent ﬁndings about ﬁrms’ demogra-
phy. As regards Italy, an up to date investigation can be found in Lotti and Santarelli
(2001).
Many of them point to a greater heterogeneity of behaviours. As regards the rela-
tions between growthrates and ﬁrms’ size, the main reﬁnement came from the analysis
of small ﬁrms life trajectories. Beyond the average similarities between small and
large ﬁrms’ proportional growth, the small ones revealed a higher probability of going
bankrupt; for those surviving, on the other hand, we usually observe higher and more
variable growth rates than large ﬁrms (Evans 1987; Dunn and Samuelson 1988; early
evidence in this direction in Mansﬁeld, 1962).
For the purpose of the background knowledge to next section, the main stylised
facts worth reminding about the different behaviour of small and large ﬁrms are the
following (see again Caves 1998):
￿ the dependence of ﬁrms’ growth rates on ﬁrm age and size;
￿ the negative relation between exit probabilities and ﬁrm size;
￿ the relative small size of ﬁrms’ entering;
￿ the heteroskedasticity of growth rate variance with ﬁrm size;
To these, it should be added somewhat a weakening of the same ﬁndings, namely,
theimportanceofidiosyncraticfactorsinexplainingtheoverallﬁrmperformance(Halti-
wanger 1997; Contini-Revelli 1992).
Another clear cut evidence emerged about the role of inﬂows and outﬂows of ﬁrms
in business ﬂuctuations. The ﬁrst datum to cite relates with the co-movements of net
business formation (entries minus exits) with gross national product. Chatterjee and
Cooper (1993) reported for the United States a correlation between quarterly net busi-
nessformationandgnpvariationsin1955:1–1983:4of54%. ForItaly,Novarese(2001)
reportsacorrelationbetweenyearlynetbusinessformationintheprivatesectorandgnp
growth in the years 1984–1998 of about 80%.
Secondly, we observe a positive turnover of ﬁrms also in ”equilibrium” conditions;
thatis, ineverymarket,evenwhenthestock ofﬁrmsis roughlyconstant, weusuallyob-
serve important inﬂows and outﬂows of ﬁrms. For Italy, in the years 1984–1998, ﬁrms’
turnover (entry rates plus exit rates) as computed with the data of Business Registry
3was on average 15%; this ﬁgure rise to 19% using the Social Security data (Novarese
2001). As for as the impact of this ﬂows on growth, Rajan and Zingales (1998) ﬁnd in
a sample of 42 countries that one-third of the growth in industries over the 1980s come
from the creation of new ﬁrms.
Related to these evidence are the ﬁndings on the role of entry and exit on job cre-
ation and destruction. The Oecd estimates shares of job creation and destruction at-
tributable to openings and closures of ﬁrms ranging from about 25% for Canada, to
67% in the United States1. In Italy, in the years 1984–1998, the same share hovered on
33%, that is, about one out of three new jobs created is attributable to the entry of new
ﬁrms (Social Security data, Malpede and Cornaglia, 2001).
In the survey studies I cited, Sutton and Caves summarise the many efforts that
have been directed in relating these dynamics to many micro- and macroeconomic
covariates, among which R&D investments, entry barriers, industry concentration and
so on. They devote less attention to the relations between ﬁnancial variables and ﬁrms’
demography. Various phenomena in corporate ﬁnance seem related to ﬁrm size and
growth; a reference to some survey studies can be found in Kumar et al. (1999). To my
purposes, the most sensible link is that going from ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial fragility to business
ﬂuctuations. The pathbreaking works on this topic are due to Hyman Minsky (1963,
1982), where a wide-ranging discussion about economic policy is strictly entangled
withtheanalysisoftheﬁnancialfactorsthatledtothe’29crisis. Themicroeconometric
research relating the ideas there put forth and industry dyamics is at his beginnings,
partlybecauseofthelack ofdata; theoreticalinvestigationproducedmanycontribution,
to which I will point to in next section.
3 Modelling strategies on ﬁrm demography and busi-
ness ﬂuctuations
The ”classic” view on the relations between ﬁrm size, the number of ﬁrms populating a
market, their entry and their exit in a perfect competition frameworkcan be traced back
to Viner (1931). The key assumption is that of a representative ﬁrm with a strictly con-
cave long run average cost function. This way, the optimal size of a ﬁrm is determined
by the efﬁciency conditions of production, and the equilibrium number of ﬁrms is de-
termined comparing this optimal size with the dimension of an exogenous demand. If
qe is the production that minimise variable costs at the level vce, the market will then











￿ is demand at price p. Firms inﬂows and outﬂows, in this framework,
areadjustment totheequilibrium, andwill be typicallydrivenbythedemandsideof the
model: Anexpansionof marketdemandwill cause the entryof newﬁrms, acontraction
the exit of some incumbent ﬁrms. Sheshinski and Dreze (1976) show that with these
1Oecd 1994, years from the mid-Eighties to 1991. The high ﬁgure for the United States stems (also) from
the different data used, relative to plants and not ﬁrms.
4assumptions another industry-structure implication of demand ﬂuctuations can be the
lowering of the average output of the representativeﬁrm. As for as dynamics, however,
this framework is particularly poor, and its implications stay at odds with the empirical
evidence.
The efforts of the literature to reconcile this raw portrait with empirical evidence
have been mainly directed in two directions: A greater realism of the theoretical as-
sumptions; a greater accordance of the models’ results with the stylised facts on ﬁrms’
demography. As totheﬁrst point,a crucialassumption thathasbeenrelaxedis thestrict
concavityof the cost function, in accordance with the observationthat there is usually a
wide production range for which variable costs are constant (Simon and Bonini 1958).
The relevance of this hypothesis is straightforward: If the production function implies
a ﬂat bottom in the variable costs curve the simple mechanism sketched above breaks
down, since a change of market demand can be absorbed (at least in part) by the active
ﬁrms; a conclusion that seems in accordance with empirical research (Rajan and Zin-
gales 1998). In this case, therefore, we can no more determine an equilibrium number
of ﬁrms (at best an equilibrium range can be derived), and the qualitative assessment
of market dynamics and ﬁrm ﬂows becomes even looser than in Viner’s case.
Keeping apart the realism of assumptions, the most challenging issue were the con-
struction of models with aggregate implications more in accordance with the stylised
facts that the empirical literature produced in the years. The contrast between the skew
size distribution of ﬁrms in real markets and the standard model with N equal ﬁrms
was ﬁrstly tackled by means of stochastic models, and various hypotheses about the
random process guiding ﬁrm growth were tested (a survey in Steindl 1965).
This family of models has been criticised for its ’purely statistical’ nature. This
notwithstanding, they are in principle reconcilable with a ﬂat-cost curve framework.
If the microfoundations of incumbent ﬁrms’ growth can be considered unsatisfactory,
their equilibrium outcomes can be justiﬁed by models like Simon and Bonini’s, and
they generate aggregate results in accordance with the early stylised facts produced on
ﬁrms’ demography.
As the empirical ﬁndings gained details, however, this modelling strategy revealed
unsatisfactory. Tackling with an equilibrium positive ﬁrm turnover, for instance, re-
quires a more radical relaxing of the representative agent hypothesis: If all ﬁrms were
characterised by an equal minimum of the long run average cost curve,a shock moving
a market out of the equilibrium would imply just one-way ﬂows, and when the equilib-
rium is established we should observe no entries and exits. The same can be said about
the different growth paths followed by young and old ﬁrms.
The efforts to better ﬁt the data, then, involved putting heterogeneity in some ﬁrm
level characteristics, as in Lucas (1978), that considered different managerial abilities;
or in the studies that considered differences in R&D and productivity levels (a most
comprehensive investigation on this topics can be found in Sutton 1998).
The ﬁrst attempt to give a comprehensive theoretical foundation of all aspects of
ﬁrm’s mobility in a competitive market structure were given in a pathbreaking paper
by Boyan Jovanovic (1982). He proposed an evolutionary model of ”noisy” selection,
where ﬁrms are assumed heterogeneous with respect to their productivity, but uncover
their true efﬁciencies through a Bayesian learning process. This give rise to patterns of
5entry,growth, and exit, that accounted for manyof the departures from the proportional
growth law, among which an higher level and variability in the growthrates of younger
ﬁrms, a positive relation between ﬁrm age and size, and a positive relation between
market proﬁtability and concentration.
Individual productivity, in Jovanovic’ model, does not change over time, and the
selection ends up in an equilibrium in which there are no inﬂows and outﬂows of ﬁrms.
Hopenhayn (1992), extends his results allowing for a stochastic evolution in the pro-
ductivity level. The framework is the same: A population of ﬁrms with perfect fore-
sight on prices and demand level, performing an intertemporal proﬁt maximisation. He
derives a limit distribution that adds to the main results of Jovanovic a positive equi-
librium ﬁrms turnover. The dynamic behaviour of the model, however, is limited to a
comparative statics analysis.
In the last decades, however, the representative agent framework has been ques-
tioned not only in its ”strongest” version, i.e. when the assumption is that realistic
macrobehaviour can be obtained ignoring the heterogeneity of agents, but also when
the heterogeneity, although considered, is managed via a massive set of unrealistic as-
sumptions imposed to derive an exact microfoundation to the aggregate behaviour; in
some way, cancelling out most of the potential effects that heterogeneity can have on
the dynamics (Martel 1996; Kirman 1992). The relaxing of this (apparently) ”weak”
RA hypothesis characterises a wide literature on the effects that heterogeneity and in-
teraction among individuals can have on the macrodynamics in presence of market
imperfections and strategic complementarities (Gallegati and Kirman 1999).
The relevance of a sounder modelling of heterogeneity and interaction for busi-
ness dynamics has been pointed out to the industrial organisation literature in many
contributions focusing on ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial fragility. Building on the seminal works of
Hyman Minsky, many authors developed these ideas focusing on how ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial
fragilityandthepresenceof bankruptcycostscan shapemacroeconomic behaviour(see
for instance Greenwald and Stiglitz (1988, 1993), Bernanke and Gertler (1989, 1990),
Kyiotaki and Moore (1997)). A feature common to these contribute is the adoption of
a Dixit-Stiglitz model of product differentiation, and the assumption of heterogeneity
in ﬁrms’ equity base level. Delli Gatti and others (2000), built an explicit link be-
tween the business ﬂuctuations emerging in these family of models, the evolution in
the distribution, and the ﬁrms’ inﬂows and outﬂows.
A convenientway of tackling with H&I is by means of a class of models developed
within statistical mechanics to study the aggregate dynamics of particle systems. The
earliest example of the use of statistical mechanics in the economic domain dates back
to F¨ ollmer (1974), and has been given a major impulse by the the seminal works of
Brock and Durlauff on social interaction and binary choice models (see for instance
Brock and Durlauff 2000).
The adoption of such tools in the ﬁeld of industrial dynamics is rather at its be-
ginning. An and Kiefer (1995), Cowan and Cowan (1998) and Dalle (1997) analyse
processes of technology adoption in presence of local and global externalities. Ozman
(2000) investigate the clustering in R&D activity.
64 The model
The model is an extension of a previous work (see Leombruni et al. 2001 ), where we
introduced nearly zero-intelligence (ZI) ﬁrms to study industry dynamics. The use of
ZI-agents, allowed us to derive a sort of benchmark for the behaviour of a market with
free entry exit, linear production costs, and equity rationing.
There, the entry exit decision were essentially external to the ﬁrms: given a positive
(negative)proﬁtability of the market - measured by the spread between the interest rate
of a secure asset and the average proﬁt rate - a certain number of ﬁrms were driven into
(out of) the market.
Here, we give back to the ﬁrms a bit of intelligence, to model the presence of local
and dispersed knowledge on the market proﬁtability.
On one side, potential entrants have access just to price signals, so that entries are
still driven by the presence of more than normal proﬁts.
On the other side, incumbents ﬁrms have at their disposal local knowledge on the
market proﬁtability. This information, however, is dispersed, and has to be extracted
lookingat thebehaviourof theothercompetitors. Thestayor go decision, then, is mod-
elled assuming non-price interaction among ﬁrms: each of them will make its choice
considering both their own performance, an the signals on the market proﬁtability that
they have looking at the stay or go decision taken by its competitors.
4.1 Firms and households
The demand side of the model consists of a constant and exogenous income Y, which
is entirely spent by households to buy equal quantities of the goods produced by the
incumbent ﬁrms. The price too is given, and is normalised to one plus an idiosyncratic
shock identically and indipendently distributed across time and ﬁrms.
The N incumbent ﬁrms face ﬁxed unitary (production) costs a. The ith ﬁrm’s
production is ﬁnanced by means of its equity base Ai, and the eventual negative slack
between equity and the ﬁnancial requirements yields a cost of r times the slack. This
is equivalent to assuming a spread between creditor and debtor r, the former being set
to zero.



























Firms remunerate their shareholders at the rate r, while the excess (shortfall) of the
proﬁt over the dividend increases (decreases) the equity base. Therefore, the motion












To study the overall behaviour of our market, we will neglect for a while the id-
iosyncratic shocks on prices, and consider separately the dynamics of A and N. For the
sake of simplicity, we’ll also treat N as continuous.
4.2 Equity base equilibrium
Holding N constant, the equilibrium condition DAi
￿ 0 is reached when
pi
￿ r (4)






￿ 1 holds2, equation (4) implies
also no liability for the ﬁrm, so we can substitute (2b) into it to obtain the following









If we draw equation (5) against N, we have the hyperbolic ”Normal proﬁts curve”




￿ in which DA
￿ 0 (cp. ﬁgure 2).
When any ﬁrm has an equity base lower than that of the NPC, the excess proﬁt will
accumulate until the equilibrium value is reached, and similarly in the opposite case.
As a consequence, in equilibrium any initial heterogeneity in the equity wipes out.
4.3 Firms’ turnover equilibrium
Now let’s hold A constant and equal for all ﬁrms, and let us specify separately the entry
and the exit mechanisms.
Given the partial equilibrium nature of the model, we assumed the existence out of
ourmarketofan unboundedset ofpotentialentrants. We assumedalsono entrybarriers
(purecontestablemarkethypothesis),so thattheinﬂowof newﬁrmsis triggeredsimply
by the difference between the average rate of proﬁt and the interest rate.
Entries, then, will ”happen” only when the market is not too crowded for the given
aggregated demand, that is when actual N is lower than the value that satisﬁes p
￿ r.
The condition is the same than (4), but the passage to (the inverse of) equation
(5), necessary to compute an N
￿ of equilibrium, is less direct. In fact, here we are
considering only the entries in the market, so that the N
￿ that we can compute from
(5) is just a benchmark with which to compare the actual number of ﬁrms: it is the
maximum number of ﬁrms compatible, given A, with at least normal proﬁts. Whether
or not that value will be a feasible equilibrium depends also on the exit ﬂuxes; and as
we will show, the answer is no.
As a consequence, the equilibrium in N given A does not imply no liability for the
ﬁrms, and to solve p
￿ r we must consider both proﬁt equations (2a-2b).
2The condition states that the unitary production costs, augmented for the costs of their ﬁnancing, must
be lower than the price. It is a sort of minimum requirement for the market to exist, and we’ll assume it
always veriﬁed.
8The switch between the two proﬁt equations is the ”No liability line” (NLL) we
drawn on ﬁgure 2, deﬁned by the condition aY
￿ N
￿ A. In the region lying over it,
ﬁrms have no liability, the ”active” proﬁt equation will be (2b), and the N
￿ satisfying
p
￿ r can again be found on the NPC.







￿ 1 is veriﬁed, with any couple
￿
A
￿ N falling in this area ﬁrms are earning
more than normal proﬁts. Hence, new ﬁrms will continue to entry until N goes over
the NLL.
Inconclusion, givenA, theuniqueN compatiblewiththeconditionp
￿ r isthatread
on the NPC. To determine the entity of the inﬂow, then, we calculate an equilibrium N
￿
via equation (5), and let the number of entrant I be equal to the difference - if positive
- between actual N and N





















Turning to the incumbent ﬁrms, the decision they have to take is whether to stay
in the market or to leave it. As said, the information they have to base on to take their
choice is twofold: their own performance, and the proﬁtability of the market.
To evaluate the latter, they try to extract some information looking at the behaviour
of their competitors. When they observe that some of them are leaving, they interpret
this fact as a signal that the market proﬁtability is getting worse. Via this interaction
effect, then, a ﬁrm has a positive probability of exiting even if it is making more than
normal proﬁts.
Formally, this is equivalent to the presence of strategic complementarities: ﬁrms
will judge convenient to make a stay or go choice of the same sign of that of their
competitors.
A convenient way of tackling this social interaction effect, is to slightly modify a
mean ﬁeld effect model as those proposed by Brock and Durlauf (see for instance ), to
let the external ﬁeld be determined endogenously.
Calling wi the choice of the ith ﬁrm, and w
￿ i the average choice of its competitors,




















￿ 1 stands for the ”go” choice, and w
￿
￿ 1 for the ”stay” choice;
hi, the external ﬁeld, is a measure of the ﬁrm’s own proﬁtability;









￿ is a random term whose realisation depends on the decision taken, indepen-
dent across individuals.







￿ to be logistically distributed, we’ll havethat

























9where b is the inverse of the scale parameter of the logistic distribution. Note that the
introduction of a random term in the expected beneﬁt V implies a positive exit proba-
bility not only with h positive, but also when the ﬁrm observes none of its competitors
exiting.











N, and aggregate them to compute the expected average choice
w in the population. Imposing a coherence between this latter and the expectations of











￿ i, and remembering that the equity base,
the market share, and hence the ﬁrms’ proﬁtability situations as expressed by hi are
the same for all ﬁrms, we can write the condition for the average choice w
















￿ iscontinuous, andis acontractionof
￿
￿ 1;1
￿ into itself,thereis atleastone
solution to (9); when Jb
￿ 1, it can be shown that the solution is unique. Assuming this
condition veriﬁed, we can re-scale w
￿ to obtain a unique value for the rate o of exiters







Now that we have deﬁned the entry exit rules, we can put them together to write
the equilibrium condition DN
￿ 0
" i
￿ o. We can proceed as follows.
Firstly, we can observe that for h to be a measure of the ﬁrm’s proﬁtability it must




￿ and there differentiable almost everywhere.
If we let also h
￿
N
￿ be continuous, and observe that equations (9-10) deﬁne implic-












is a continuous and increasing function of N.









￿ , descends that there is





rA in which entries are equal to exits; that is, ﬁrms
turnover will be in equilibrium in a point lying strictly under the NPC.
A convenient way to better qualify this equilibrium is to consider both i and o as
functions of the product AN. In ﬁgure 1 we plotted them with values of the parameters





If we read this ﬁgure ”forgetting” for a while the A on the X-axes, we can see the
N of equilibrium for the turnover derived above.




￿ is separable in AN. If we assume the




￿ , we’ll have that the equilibrium condition for the
10Figure 1: Firms’ turnover equilibrium.
ﬁrms’ turnover will depend only on the product of A and N. In the ﬁgure, a change
DN
￿ 1
￿ DA will not change the position of the entry/exit rates curves, and hence the
position of the equilibrium.
If we call k the value of the product AN at which the two curves intersect, we can

















￿ doesn’t depends on A, but depends on all the other parameters of the
model.
This turnoverequilibrium (TE) curveacts as an attractor for N (cp. ﬁgure 2). Given
A, for values of N lower than that identiﬁed by equation (12), we’ll be at the left of the
equilibrium of ﬁgure 1: entries will be higher then exits, and N will increase. Similarly
in the opposite case.
4.4 Market dynamics and heterogeneity
In the last two paragraphs, we derived the equilibrium condition for the equity base as
a function of N, and the equilibrium condition for the ﬁrms’ turnover as a function of
A.
In ﬁgure 2 we draw the two equilibrium maps, together with the no liability line.
The direction of the trajectories around these maps is also reported: according to what
stated in paragraph 4.2, in the area above the NPC the equity will decrease; while in
paragraph 4.3 we saw that in the area above the TE curve there will be an excess of
exits on entries, and N will decrease - similarly in the opposite cases.
We also saw that the latter lies strictly under the former, so that between the two
we have an attractor-basin where the system will fall with certainty.
11The dynamics inside the basin is that depicted: with agents all equal, the market













￿ phase diagram - no heterogeneity.
We must consider two more factors to better assess the behaviour of our market:
the role of liabilities, and that of heterogeneity.
In the ﬁgure, we draw the no liability line under the two other curves, but that is
not always the case. The position of the NLL and of the NPC depends only on the pa-
rameters r and a, and on the level of the aggregateddemandY, while the TE curve will
dependalsoontheparametersbandJ,withwhichwemodelledthestrategicinteraction
among ﬁrms, and on g. For some conﬁgurations of these three latter parameters, then,
the TE curve can go under the NLL. This will change slightly the trajectories around
the equilibrium maps, since both the equity and the turnoverwill evolve according to a
different proﬁt equation.





￿ of the model parameters will change. Without getting into details, it can
be shown that it will lie under the TE curve as calculated ignoring ﬁnancial costs. With
no heterogeneity,anyhow,this will not change the qualitative dynamics depicted so far.
When we allow for heterogeneity in the ﬁrms’ equity base, the portrait can change
sensibly.
On one side, the equilibrium condition we derived for the ﬁrms turnover is again
no more directly applicable. While the entries are driven only by the average measure
of the market proﬁtability, the exit rule has a nonlinearity that makes the aggregation
sensible to the dispersion of the distribution. Experimentally, as we’ll see, the hetero-
geneity implies a downward shift in the TE.
In addition, if the equity dispersion goes over a threshold, a not-empty subset of
ﬁrms will lie under the NLL. This will change both the beneﬁt function on which they
base their stay or go choice on, and the motion equation of their equity. In other words,
we can have two non empty subset of ﬁrms following two different dynamic regimes.
12On the other side, the direction followed inside the basin attractor can change its
sign, providedthat the new ﬁrms entering the market have an average equity lower than
the incumbents’. This composition effect, in fact, countervails the tendency in the rise
of the average A when we are under the NPC.
Both these effects are easily handled building an agent based simulation of our
model, with which we can also have some hints on the dynamics around these maps.
5 The simulations
In this section we ﬁrst report some technical details concerning the simulations con-
ducted. We then proceed to show the artiﬁcial time series generated, ﬁrst reproducing
the results above derived assuming no heterogeneity among ﬁrms and a unique equi-
librium in the stay or go choice, then relaxing both of them.
5.1 Technical details
The simulations have been conducted in Swarm, a set of software libraries developed
at the Santa Fe Institute in New Mexico - starting from 1995 -, to help simulating com-
plex systems. The underlying programming languages of Swarm are Objective-C and
Java, which object-oriented architecture is particularly suited to run agent-based simu-
lations3. In anutshell, asimulationinSwarmis builtupputting togetherapopulation of
artiﬁcial agents - independent ”pieces” of software containing the agents’ behavioural
algorithms and their vector of state variables, and a schedule with the ordered list and
the timing of all the actions each agent will make.
The core of our simulation has been built up with three kinds of agents: ﬁrms
and households (whose state variables and behaviour are a straightforward translation
of the model characteristics described above), and an environment, whose role is to
collect and distribute statistics, to co-ordinate entries and exits, and to behave as an
interface between the other agents.
For every time-step of the simulation, the main items of the schedule are the fol-
lowing:
1. Households: do shopping;
2. Environment: check for bankruptcies;
3. Firms: take the stay or go decision;
4. Environment: create new ﬁrms.
During the ﬁrst step, a representative household spends entirely its yearly income.
It divides it equally among the incumbent ﬁrms, except for a random multiplicative
shock on the price payed to each seller. The shock is extracted from a uniform dis-
tribution with mean one, whose support is a simulation parameter modiﬁable at start
3For economic simulations in Swarm see Luna and Stefansson (2001 ) and Luna and Perrone (2002 .
Technical details on the Swarm Toolkit can be found on the web, at http://www.swarm.org.
13up. The eventual slack between yearly income and actual spending is added to the
following period income.
In the second step of the schedule the environment checks if there have been ”hard”
bankruptcies, i.e. if any ﬁrm’s equity base has fallen under a threshold - that we set to
zero. Afterwards, it asks to all ﬁrms to take their stay or go decision, providing them
with the macro variables values they need in order to take it.
To implement the stay or go choice, we had to better specify equation (7). For the














where L is the lag operator, and b is the number of periods considered by the ﬁrms to
evaluate their own proﬁtability. For what concerns the expectations on the behaviour of
their competitors, we assumed again an adaptive mechanism: they have been put equal












Finally, the entry of new ﬁrms is driven by the Environment object. If there’s a
positive slack between the overall rate of proﬁt and the interest rate, the environment
will create a number of new ﬁrms according to equation (6). In accordance with empir-
ical ﬁndings, we let new entrants have an average equity base lower than the entrants.
However, not to put a bias towards a predetermined equity level, we extracted it from
its distribution among the ﬁrst quantiles of the incumbents.
5.2 Simulation runs
To get started, we simulated the model with no shocks on prices, and a unique solution
for the stay or go choice - the condition being bJ
￿ 1 4.
As we can see in ﬁgure 3, the qualitative outcomes we obtain are in line with those
predicted by the formal study of the model. Once the trajectory goes over the TE
curve5, the market starts moving towards low N and high A; the path seems quite close
to the TE curve, showing faster adjustments in the number of ﬁrms.
Putting an idiosyncratic shock on prices, this portrait changes as follow.
First ofall,thedynamicoftheaverageequitybasewillbedumpedbyacomposition
effect, since new ﬁrms will be endowed on average of an equity base lower than the
incumbents. As a consequence, the equilibrium condition DA
￿ 0 will be satisﬁed
somewhere under the NPC.
The movement towards low N and high A, then, will be either slower, or even
reversed.
As a ﬁrst step towards this second case, we calibrated the simulation parameters so
to obtain the almost coincidence of the two curves. In ﬁgures 4 and 5 we can see two
4Assuming, as we are doing, adaptive expectations, the equilibrium is also stable (cp. Brock and Durlauf
2000).

















Normal profit curve No liability line Turnover equilibrium
Figure 3:
recurrent stylised facts that characterise the dynamics also in this quasi-equilibrium
case, namely: a right skewed distribution of the equity base, and irregular ﬂuctuations
of the number of ﬁrms’ time series6.
Figure 4:








/ 6. In this
case, so as in some following simulations, we have bJ
4 1, so that we can have multiple equilibria in the stay
or go decision. Anyway, it can be shown that a jump from one equilibrium to another can only occur either
with a very large exogenous shock, or with a downward shift in the h, towards negative values. The latter in
our model cannot occur, since h is endogenous, and anneals rapidly to positive values, the former seemed to
us out of the scope of our analysis.
15Figure 5:
The former is surely related to the composition effect due to the low equity level
of the entrants; so as the latter are obviously ﬁred by the stochastic components of the
simulation.
Both of them, however, are strictly related also to the interaction term ruling the
exits. As a matter of fact, the relation between the asymmetry and the parameters J
and b is straightforward, since they inﬂuence directly the entity of the exit ﬂuxes; and
hence also the way in which the turnover changes the composition of the population.
For some set of parameters, theskewness can also turn negative: when all theﬁrms face
no liability costs, ”little is better”: a lower A brings an higher rate of proﬁt, which in
turn is sufﬁcient to countervailthe signal received by the exit ﬂuxes, strongly ampliﬁed
by the high J. While the right tail of the distribution can be almost be cancelled out.
With heterogeneity, and a non empty quota of ﬁrms facing ﬁnancial constraints, this
somewhat counterintuitive effect disappears.
The strenght of interaction has a quite direct relationalso with business ﬂuctuations,
via two effects: it can stuck an agent to a behaviour consistent with the others’ one,
hence stabilising it; and it can amplify random shocks that wouldn’t elsewhere have
great effect on the aggregate.
Letting the heterogeneity be higher - relatively to the distance between the NPC
and the NLL - we can observe a change in the dynamic regime.
We already saw how the NPC, because of the composition effect, can be lower than
in the base model. It happens something similar to the TE curve, that is, the curves
that we draw as a function of the average value of the equity, overestimates the level
at which there is equilibrium in the ﬁrms turnover. This is a common result of all
the simulations conducted, and maybe it was predictable, studying more deeply the
nonlinear speciﬁcation of the entry-exit rules.
A little bit harder to predict, was the fact that the two curves can change their
relative position. In ﬁgure 6, we report the outcomes of two simulations, conducted
with all the structural parameters equal, but with a different variance of the random
shock. As a benchmark, we draw only the NLL together with the series, since it is the
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Figure 6:
Apparently, the higher dispersion in the equity base caused the ”empiric” ﬁrms’
turnover equilibrium curve to go above the line that stabilise the average A. This fact,
changed the direction followed by the system inside the attractor basin, and caused the
second experiment end towards higher values of N. In the ﬁgure, actually, we reported
three hundred time steps for the series with the lower noise, and six hundreds for the
higher variance one.
This latter, in fact, for the ﬁrst three hundred time steps remains about the same
levels of N. Afterwards, ”something happens”, and the series starts moving.
6 Conclusions
Perfect competition is usually associated with the idea that ﬁrms takefor exogenous the
behaviour of their competitors. I studied a case in which this idea is not connected with
the assumption of no interaction at all between agents. Namely, I considered the non
price interaction between incumbent ﬁrms, due to the process of knowledge extraction
- about the market proﬁtability - in which they are involved in.
This assumption has been modelled with a mean ﬁeld effect, in which the external
ﬁeld - the ﬁrms’ own proﬁtability - is endogenous, since it depends also on the entry
ﬂuxes and on the dynamics of their equity base.
Allowing for idiosyncratic shocks on prices, the simulations produced some ar-
tiﬁcial stylised facts of interest: a right skewed distribution for the equity base, at-
tributable mainly to a composition effect; a long run positive ﬁrms turnover, which is
related, among the others, to the dispersion of the equity distribution; business cycles,
17triggered by the stochastic components of the model and magniﬁed by the interaction
component of the decision taken by the ﬁrms.
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